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EXEMPTION FROM THE DRAFT: A STUDY IN CIVIL LIBERTIES
JULIEN CORNELLf
A MILITARY draft raises a basic conflict inherent in the democratic process:
the right of nonconformist individuals to go their own way against the right
of the majority to apply coercion in the name of common necessity. In a
society which maintains the principle that civil rights of individuals and
miuiority groups are worthy of special protection even under the pressures of
war, the treatment meted out by draft officials and reviewing courts to per-
sons claiming statutory exemption from the draft presents a case study in
democratic government which is of far greater importance than the welfare
of the individuals involved.
The flood of litigation which has arisen out of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 ' has revolved principally around exemptions for three
groups: aliens, ministers, and conscientious objectors.
The Act imposes liability for military training and service upon "every
male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in
the United States who is between the ages of eighteen and forty-five . , ."
except as otherwise provided. 2 This clause exempts, by necessary implica-
tion, aliens not residing in the United States. In addition, a proviso exempts
resident aliens if they are enemies unacceptable to the military forces or
neutrals who declare their unwillingness to serve.
3
Another section 4 exempts "regular or duly ordained ministers of religion,"
"students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity
schools," and persons who by reason of "religious training and belief" are
"conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." While minis-
ters and divinity students are wholly exempt, conscientious objectors are
assigned either to non-combatant military service or to "work of national
importance under civilian direction."
Under the scheme of the Act, exemption has been accorded only to the
groups enumerated above. Persons otherwise liable for service who are not
called by reason of physical unfitness, dependency, or occupation are not
thereby exempted; their liability for service is merely deferred. Although
rulings of draft boards on questions of deferment have sometimes been at-
tacked judicially, the courts have usually refused to review on the ground
that responsibility for such decisions rests exclusively with the draft boards.
This article is concerned only with cases involving exemption as distin-
guished from deferment.
t Member N. Y. Bar; author of THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND TnE LAW (1943).
1. 54 STAT. 885 (1940), as amended, 50 U. S. C., App. §§ 301-18 (Supp. 1946) (here-
after cited by section number only).
2. § 303(a). See amendment 50 U. S. C. A., App. § 303(a) (Supp. 1946).
3. Ibid.
4. § 305. This section also exempts certain public officials and military officers, classes
which can be precisely ascertained and have presented no problem.
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EXE PTION OF ALIENS
Not until World War II did the United States attempt to compel military
service of aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens. In
fact, our government until 1940 had always scrupulously insisted upon the
exemption of aliens from military service. As early as 1803, Secretary of
State Madison wrote to the French authorities in protest against the draft-
ing of an American citizen residing abroad:
"The most inviolable and most obvious right of an alien resident
is that of withdrawing himself from a limited and transitory alle-
giance having no other foundation than his voluntary residence it-
self. The infraction of this right is consequently among the greatest
of injuries that can be done to individuals, and among the justest
of causes for the interposing protection of their government." 5
Both in the Civil War 6 and World War I only those aliens who had de-
clared their intention to become citizens were liable for military service; all
others, whether resident or not, were exempt.
It is frequently argued that the immunity of aliens from military service is
established by international law. The doctrine is that:
"Foreigners cannot be required to perform military service. An
exception may be made to this rule where it is necessary to defend a
locality against brigands or savages.
"Military service is by its nature a civic and political obligation;
it cannot, therefore, be separated from the quality of citizenship.
Now since political rights are not ordinarily granted to foreigners,
they should not, therefore, be burdened with civic obligations. If
they should be compelled to serve under a foreign flag they might
find themselves shedding their blood for a cause to which they are
indifferent or for interests opposed to those of their native land." s
Nevertheless, reliance on immunity by international law was unsuccessful
in United States v. Lamothe 9 in which a citizen of Haiti, admittedly a resident
of the United States, refused to be inducted and challenged Congress' power
to compel military service of an alien who had not declared his intention to
become a citizen. It was argued that the power to compel military service
contained in the Constitution "I permitted the raising of armed forces only
in accordance with the accepted rules of international law. The court, how-
ever, held that the initial Congressional policy of not drafting aliens did not
amount to a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution and that
no such limitation could be inferred from the language of the Constitution.
5. 4 MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTErmATIoNAL LAW (1906) 52.
6. 12 STAT. 731 (1863).
7. 40 STAT. 77 (1917), 50 U. S. C., App. § 202 (1940).
8. BLUN-rScLi, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFI (1895) § 391.
9. 152 F. (2d) 340 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
10. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
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The present Act subjects to military service only those aliens who reside
in the United States. Since the statute attempts no definition of residence,
the Director of Selective Service issued a regulation outlining a general
procedure for determining the question. 12 By this regulation, aliens who
have declared their intention of becoming citizens are deemed to be residents
regardless of the length of time they have been in the United States. 3
Aliens who have not announced such an intention are also considered resi-
dents if, within three months of entering the country, they have not applied
to a local draft board for a determination of residence and obtained a cer-
tificate of non-residence.' 4 In the case of aliens who do so apply, the regula-
tion, like the statute, fixes no standard by which local boards should resolve
the question of residence, and in practice most boards have applied the same
inflexible three-months test. Thus, in general, any alien remaining in the
country for three months has been subjected to the draft.
The categorical application of this rule of thumb, both in the regulation
and by the practice of local boards, is plainly not contemplated in the
statute, which in no way purports to subject to service aliens who are in
fact non-resident. It often happens that business men, students, or tourists
visit our shores on temporary missions requiring many months for comple-
tion, without any intention of establishing a residence. Whatever eviden-
tiary value mere length of time may have, it can hardly be conclusive of the
factual issue. The status of an alien as fixed by the immigration laws, how-
ever, affords a yardstick ready-made for these'cases. Aliens entering under
the immigration quota are admitted for permanent residence, while those
not entering under the quota are usually admitted for a six-months period,
which may be extended, and their status is that of non-residents. 1 In either
case an alien's classification by the immigration authorities appears from his
visa. The Selective Service officials, however, have consistently ignored this
prior determination of status, and many aliens who were clearly non-resi-
dents under the immigration laws have nonetheless been drafted. But for
unexplained reasons very few such cases have been taken to court. Perhaps
it is too much to expect that an alien will have the courage and resources to
contest these rulings, especially in wartime.
In Ex parte Ghosh,'5 the only reported case dealing with this discrepancy
in policy between the Immigration Department and the Director of Selective
Service, the District Court for the Southern District of California said:
11. 54 STAT. 885 (1940), as amended, 50 U. S. C., App. § 303(a) (Supp. 1946).
12. Selective Service Regs. § 611.13 (1942). Authority to determine the question of
residence was delegated to the Director of Selective Service by the President. Exzc. ORD R
No. 9410, 8 FED. REG. 17319 (1943).
13. Selective Service Regs. § 611.11 (1942).
14. Id. § 611.21.
15. See 43 STAT. 155 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 204 (1940).
16. 58 F. Supp. 851 (S. D. Cal. 1944).
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"In connection with this matter the determination by the Bureau
of Naturalization and Immigration that this man retained his stu-
dent status and is thus not a resident, must be given weight. He is
not, under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, entitled
either to citizenship, or to be a permanent resident of the United
States, or a resident at all ...
"While it may be argued that such determination is not binding
upon the Director of Selective Service nor upon the local board, still
the local board did not make any inquiry in that respect, or in that
case, when they made their decision on March 10th.
"And after all it is one government, and I do not think it is within
the contemplation of our system that a man should be fish before
one department and fowl before another .... ,, 17
In an unreported case, United States v. Fuhrmann,8 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York reached a contrary conclusion. A young
German who had been studying in the United States was unable because of
war conditions to leave the country when his visa expired. Consequently his
status under the immigration laws was changed from that of a student ad-
mitted for temporary residence to that of an alien subject to deportation for
illegally remaining after the date set for his departure, but he never had any
intention of remaining permanently in the United States and was still con-
sidered a non-resident. Nevertheless, his draft board classified him as sub-
ject to military service, and when he refused to be inducted, he was indicted
and convicted. In his brief on appeal the accused contended that, being in
fact a non-resident alien, he was exempt from military service and could not
be compelled to serve. He argued further that failure to file an application
for non-resident status with his draft board did not impair his rights since
the statutory exemption is absolute and the regulation making exemption
conditional is contrary to the statute. Before the case was reached for argu-
ment, the United States Attorney consented to dismissal of the indictment.
It is not clear whether the United States abandoned the case because its
position was untenable or because it did not desire to injure its relations with
foreign governments by going on record as compelling military service of
their citizens who came to this country as students. In this case the ruling
of the draft board was particularly ill-advised because the alien was a Ger-
man citizen who was being asked to take up arms against his own people
and to commit treason against his government. As was stated in Fuhr-
mann's brief on appeal:
"Surely the thousands of Americans who have studied at Heidel-
berg and other universities would be appalled to find themselves
under any allegiance to Germany, or subject to compulsory service
in the German army, merely because of their having sought an edu-
cation at a German university."
17. Id. at 854.
18. D.C., S. D. N. Y. File No. C116-289 (Jan. 28, 1944).
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Even though they may have become residents of the United States, citi-
zens of certain countries may claim exemption from military service. Any
neutral may be relieved from service upon application, but if he elects to
claim.this exemption he is specifically debarred from becoming a citizen of
the United States.19 Moreover, a neutral availing himself of this exemption
may incur the additional penalty of rendering himself unable to return to
this country if once he leaves it; for the immigration law, with a few minor
exceptions, subjects to deportation any one who enters the United States
while under a disability which prevents him from becoming a citizen.20
Enemy nationals are subject to service only if they are found acceptable
to the military authorities.2 ' While such persons have no right to exemption,
it has ordinarily been granted when the alien objected to being drafted.
If residing in the United States, citizens of co-belligerent nations are liable
for service on the same basis as' American citizens.2 2 However, the United
States has entered into a series of treaties with co-belligerent nations pro-
viding that before either party compels military service of citizens of the
other who reside within its territory, it will give such persons an opportunity
to enlist in the armed forces of their native country. Such treaties have been
negotiated with eighteen countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Greece, India, Mexico, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, United
Kingdom and Yugoslavia. Citizens of co-belligerent nations with which no
such treaties have been concluded may not claim, as of right, the privilege of
enlisting in their own forces. Governments of co-belligerent nations not
party to such treaties have on occasion unsuccessfully objected to this
feature of our draft law.
In some cases the statute compels military service of aliens in violation of
pre-existing treaties. While there is nothing to prevent the United States,
by legislative enactment, from refusing to honor its international obliga-
tions, the wisdom of such action by a nation which consistently proclaims
the sanctity of treaties seems doubtful. This situation was discussed in a
letter from the Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, dated April 15, 1941, in which he wrote:
"The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provides for the
registration of all male aliens within specified ages residing in the
United States and makes such aliens who have not declared their in-
tention to become citizens of the United States liable for training
and service.
"The Department has received communications from a number
of foreign diplomatic missions complaining that nationals of their
19. 55 STAT. 845 (1941), 50 U. S. C., App. § 303(a) (Supp. 1941).
20. 43 STAT. 162 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 213(c) (1940).
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countries are being drafted for training and service. Some of these
complaints are based on treaty provisions and the Mexican Em-
bassy has taken the position that the drafting of its nationals for
military service is contrary to the principles of international law."
MINISTERS OF RELIGION
The statutory provision extending absolute exemption to ministers and
students preparing for the ministry 23 was copied almost verbatim from the
Act of 1917.24 Both statutes require, as prerequisites to exemption, that
ministers be duly ordained and students be enrolled in recognized divinity
or theological schools.
The reason for exempting ministers and students preparing for the minis-
try is not readily apparent. It may be that Congress felt that the spiritual
guidance of ministers in wartime was essential to the national well-being.
Or it may be that Congress was influenced by the basic pacifist character of
the Christian religion and did not wish to place those who had dedicated
themselves to following the teachings of Christ in a position where they
would have to abandon their principles by engaging in warfare. Still another
explanation has been offered. Many prominent ministers are avowed pac-
ifists and would refuse to be drafted. The imprisonment of such leaders
might encourage pacifism, a result to be avoided in wartime. Whatever the
explanation may be, in most cases ministers have gladly accepted the exempt
status which the law gives them, although some have complained that the
clergy should not be so privileged and have refused to claim exemption.
Most of the litigation about the exemption for ministers has concerned
the Jehovah's Witnesses. This is a militant evangelistic group operating
chiefly through a corporation known as The Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society which was chartered in New York in 1909, maintains headquarters
in New York City, and operates its own printing and publishing house and
broadcasting station. The corporation prints and distributes bibles, books,
magazines, pamphlets and other tracts which are used and sold by its mem-
bers in spreading their views. The Jehovah's Witnesses rely almost entirely
upon the Bible as a direct revelation of the word of God and condemn all
established churches as deviating from the truth. The sect maintains no
churches but acts through direct canvassing by its members, all of whom
regard themselves as ministers.
The Jehovah's Witnesses have been persecuted even more than most un-
popular minorities. Frequently their methods of house-to-house appeal and
their condemnation of other religious organizations have led the police to
restrict their activities. Likewise local authorities have tried to e.x-pel their
children from public schools for refusing to salute the flag in the belief that
to do so would violate the biblical injunction against graven images.2 5 When-
23. 54 STAT. 888 (1940), 50 U. S. C., App. § 305(d) (1940).
24. 40 STAT. 78 (1917), 50 U. S. C., App. § 204 (1940).
25. Such expulsion was finally held to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
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ever discriminated against, however, they have diligently and ably defended
their rights in the courts, and the result has been a long series of far-reaching
decisions on civil liberties. With no less zeal they have pressed their claims
to exemption under the Selective Service and Training Act, and the sect
has been responsible for more than half the cases appealed to higher courts.
The Jehovah's Witnesses have uniformly maintained in the courts that
they are all ministers. It is their belief that:
"Any individual of sound mind and mature in years, who has a
knowledge of God's Word and appreciates His commands, and who
then makes a full consecration unto God to do His will, is ordained
of God to be His servant, for ever, if he maintains his covenant....
One who has consecrated his life to the service of the Most High will
preach the gospel of the Kingdom as he has opportunity, and
really puts forth every effort to do that. One does not go to a theo-
logical seminary or school to be an ordained minister of the gospel.
To go there would mean that he was ordained of men to preach
God's Word; whereas the only One who can give the real authority
to preach the Word of God is Jehovah himself, even as he gave it
unto His Son. (Isa. 61: 1, 2)." 26
As a result, every Jehovah's Witness has claimed exemption as an or-
dained minister. The Director of Selective Service found it necessary to
lay down some test by which these claims could be judged. The theory that
ordination comes directly from God makes it impossible to apply ordination
as a test since all Jehovah's Witnesses regard themselves as ordained. Many
of them, however, hold secular jobs and confine their ministry to spare time.
In such cases the Director of Selective Service has ruled that they do not
merit exemption as ministers. In order to determine which of those who
claim to be full time ministers are actually so engaged, the Director of Selec-
tive Service in 1943 compiled a list of the 6278 Witnesses who were classified
by the Society as "Pioneer Publishers." These "Pioneers" are required to
put in 150 hours a month, or an average of 5 hours a day, in service of their
Society.27 Information from the master list was given to local draft boards,
which were instructed to grant or deny exemption according to whether or
not the name of a claimant appeared on the list. Apparently the theory was
that those Witnesses who were recognized by the sect as devoting 150 hours a
month to the ministry were full time ministers and should be exempt,
whereas those not so recognized should not be exempted.
In many cases, however, a Jehovah's Witness might be spending full time
in the ministry and yet not be listed as a "Pioneer Publisher." In such case
he was automatically denied exemption under the method of classification
in Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), overruling
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
26. 1944 YEARBOOK OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES (1943) 32-3.
27. Id. at 61.
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set up by the Director of Selective Service. Here the courts have rightly
held that it was error for a draft board not to make an independent inquiry
into the facts.2'
A further question raised by the exemption of ministers and divinity
students relates to the recognition of rabbis and rabbinical students of un-
orthodox faith. Selective Service officials in New York City experienced
difficulty in dealing with claims for exemption presented by unorthodox
rabbis and rabbinical students in small seminaries which were unrecognized
by orthodox Judaism. Whether or not such rabbis and rabbinical schools
should be recognized under the Act involved conflicts in Hebraic faith and
practice which were quite beyond the ability of draft boards to understand.
Accordingly, the Selective Service officials in New York City referred such
questions to a special advisory panel of five eminent rabbis and laymen:
Rabbi Herbert Goldstein, Judge Jonah J. Goldstein, Rabbi Elias Solomon,
Dr. Samuel Nirenstein and Mr. Bernard Sewel. The panel held hearings,
kept minutes of its proceedings, and made recommendations to Selective
Service headquarters. Members of the panel, although men of high standing
and integrity, were of orthodox belief and could not help but express in their
findings some of the sharp cleavage and bitterness which exists between
orthodox rabbinical circles and some of the modern offshoots of Judaism.
A case which reflects this situation is United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain
which arose upon a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether a draft board
had erred in denying exemption to a young rabbi upon the recommendation
of the special advisory panel. The relator had never attended a rabbinical
seminary but had studied under his father. He claimed he had been or-
dained by his father and two other rabbis, and his local draft board received
communications from two rabbinical societies certifying that he was a mem-
ber and a rabbi. He claimed also to have a congregation which had been
founded by his father, who had recently retired; that he was principal of a
Hebrew school for children of the congregation; and that he performed
marriages and funerals. The congregation, however, numbered only twenty
to thirty, and the school had but ten pupils. Furthermore, there was evi-
dence that the father was considered the true rabbi of the congregation. The
advisory panel found him to be lacking in rabbinical lore and in knowledge
of Hebraic testaments. It was the relator's contention, however, that the
advisory panel questioned him about orthodox rabbinical beliefs with which
he was unfamiliar, and that the panel was not qualified to investigate his
rabbinical qualifications because of the unorthodoxy of his beliefs. He
pointed out that his rabbinical status was attested to by five rabbis of his
own faith and maintained that this was conclusive. The only unfavorable
evidence, he contended, was submitted by members of rival branches of his
faith who, in effect, asserted only that his qualifications and ordination were
28. See United States v, Balogh, C.C.A. 2d, Oct. 31, 1946.
29. 144 F. (2d) 944 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
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not in accordance with their own requirements. The court held that judicial
review of draft board classifications extended only to determination of
whether a board had any evidence to sustain its ruling, and in this case it
was held that such evidence could be found and that the ruling would there-
fore not be disturbed. A reading of the opinion, however, leaves one in
doubt as to whether the relator may not have been the victim of sectarian
jealousies.30
The same court, in United States ex rel. Levy v. Cain,3 later circumscribed
the use which could be made of the advisory panel. A local board had denied
the relator exemption as a rabbinical student upon a panel recommendation
which stated merely that his status did not warrant such a classification.
The court held that in following this "general verdict" the board had ab-
dicated its statutory duty by relying on the panel, not only for expert
opinion on incidental ecclesiastical questions, but for a determination of
the entire issue in the case. Accordingly, the relator was ordered released
from custody of the army without prejudice to further proceedings before
the draft board. In discussing the type of issue which might properly be
referred to the panel, the court stated that the local board could seek advice
on such questions as the standing and character of a seminary, whether that
standing was being impaired by allowing the seminary to be used for draft
evasion, and whether the relator was honestly pursuing a course of rabbinical
studies with intention of becoming a rabbi; but could not submit to the
panel such questions as whether the registrant was trustworthy or whether
the seminary was abetting an attempt to evade the draft.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Exemption from combatant training and service is granted under the Act
to "any person . . . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 11 Such persons
are to be inducted and assigned to non-combatant service as defined by the
President. In practide, they are put in medical units of the army and navy.
The Act also provides that persons who have conscientious objections even
to such non-combatant service shall, "in lieu of such induction, be assigned
to work of national importance under civilian direction." 14 Such persons
have been placed in work camps and in some cases permitted to volunteer as
guinea pigs in medical experiments, as parachute fire fighters, and for other
welfare projects.
30. The case went so far as to involve such sectarian niceties as whether the certificate
of ordination was valid if it did not contain the Hebraic words "Yoreh Yorch" or "Yodin
Yodin" which certain rabbis termed essential to a valid ordination.
31. 149 F. (2d) 338 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
32. It was also held that the procedure followed by the panel was improper in that the
names of the panel were not disclosed to the registrant so that he could effectively challenge
the members for bias or predilection.
33. 54 STAT. 889 (1940), 50 U. S. C. App. § 305(g) (1940).
34. Ibid.
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The foregoing exemption is much broader than the World War I exemp-
tion, which extended only to members of "any well-recognized religious sect
or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed
or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose
religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance
with the creed or principles of said religious organizations ... ." s Besides
being thus restricted to members of certain religious sects, the 1917 exemp-
tion contained another limitation not included in the present statute. The
exemption extended only to combatant service, and no provision was made
for men who objected also to service in non-combatant military capacities.
While more liberal than its World War I counterpart, the present Act
still fails to recognize the conscientious scruples of a substantial number of
persons: those unwilling even to register for conscription or unwilling to
perform any service whatever under a conscription statute; those whose
objections have a political, humanitarian and philosophical, rather than a
"religious," basis; and those willing to fight in some circumstances and thus
not opposed to "participation in war in any form" but unwilling to engage
in the type of struggle for which the draft was invoked.
The English law, 6 in contrast, makes special provisions for these groups.
A separate register is maintained for conscientious objectors. Persons un-
willing to serve in any capacity, civilian or military, under a conscription
statute may claim total exemption, which has been granted to about six
per cent of English conscientious objectors. There is no religious test of
objection, and the question is merely whether the objections are conscien-
tiously held. Nor need an Englishman object to "war in any form." Exemp-
tion was even granted to an Indian nationalist who had no objection to war
as such, but was unwilling to fight for the British Empire so long as India
was held in subjection. 3 The British authorities apparently reasoned that a
political objection should be regarded as within the statute when so deeply
held that it became a matter of inner conviction as to right or wrong and
not merely a matter of opinion or personal expediency.
Another important difference between the British and American statutes
is that the British law provides for the assignment of conscientious objectors
to ordinary jobs at current wages, or to fire fighting or other public service.
In practice they have been assigned to work in their own communities in
employment for which they are particularly qualified and have been able to
live with and support their families. Under the American system con-
scientious objectors unwilling to perform non-combatant military service
have been herded into concentration camps where they have worked with-
out pay, usually in menial jobs of little public significance. After the system
had been in operation for some time, some objectors were released from the
35. 40 STAT. 78 (1917), 50 U. S. C., App. § 204 (1940).
36. National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, 2-3 Gso. VI, c. 81, § 5, as amended.
37. BULLETIN, CENTRAL BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJETORS (London, May, 1944) 8.
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camps to undertake work in mental hospitals, on farms, in medical experi-
ments, and in parachute fire fighting. However, they still received no pay
and were invariably sent to communities far distant from their homes.
For refusal to go to work camps, failure to register, or unwillingness to be
inducted after being denied exemption, several thousand conscientious ob-
jectors have been imprisoned under sentences ranging up to five years.
Among this number have been many Jehovah's Witnesses who, after un-
successfully claiming to be ministers, were classified as conscientious ob-
jectors but refused to report to work camps on the ground that they would
thereby be prevented from exercising their calling as ministers. As of June
30, 1944, a total of 4,363 conscientious objectors had been convicted. Of
this number 3,224-including over tventy-five hundred Jehovah's Wit-
nesses-then remained in prison.38 Conscientious objectors at that time
comprised about one-sixth of the entire Federal prison population 19 and ac-
counted for about two-thirds of the men imprisoned for draft violations.
These figures are in startling contrast to like statistics in Great Britain where
in August, 1944 only about two hundred conscientious objectors, including
Jehovah's Witnesses, were in prison 40 although the entire number of con-
scientious objectors was far greater than in this country. About fifteen
hundred conscientious objectors remain in American prisons 41 as compared
with thirteen still in British prisons.
42
It is apparent from the large number of Jehovah's Witnesses and con-
scientious objectors found in prisons that this problem has been one of very
real importance to the government. The maintenance of these men at the
peak cost over two million dollars per year, and the aggregate cost of keep-
ing them in prison will probably amount to ten million dollars. Not only
has this expense been imposed upon the taxpayers, but the labor of several
thousand able bodied men has been lost to the nation. It was this situation
which led a Canadian official to state that Canada with its labor shortage
during the war could not afford the "emotional luxury" of keeping such men
in concentration camps.
43
The most important question involving conscientious objectors which
has arisen in the courts concerns the construction of the phrase "religious
training and belief." Many conscientious objectors who did not happen to
38. ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR BUREAU OF PRISONS (1944) 45, n. d.
39. Out of a total of 18,392 prisoners on June 30, 1944, 3,224 were conscientious ob-
jectors. Op. cit. supra note 38 at 44.
40. BULLETIN, CENTRAL BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (London, Aug., 1944)
29.
41. Attorney Gene-al Clark, in a letter of Aug. 8, 1946, to the Committee for Amnesty,
stated that there were then about 1250 Jehovah's Witnesses and 175 other conscientious
objectors in federal prisons.
42. Letter from Central Board for Conscientious Objectors, London, to Committee for
Amnesty July 31, 1946.
43. TnE REPORTER, NATIONAL SERVICE BOARD FOR RELIGIOUS OnJrCTORS (Aug. 15,
1944) 7.
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belong to a church, or whose views ran along unorthodox lines, have been
denied exemption and have attempted to obtain from the courts a construc-
tion of the statute broader than that followed by their draft boards.
The necessity for a construction of this phrase was recognized early when
one of the several hearing officers appointed by the President to investigate
and report on claims of conscientious objectors wrote to the Attorney Gen-
eral for advice on the meaning of "religious training and belief." The At-
torney General referred the matter to the Director of Selective Service,
General Hershey, who issued an opinion that no one could be recognized as a
conscientious objector under the statute unless he believed in "some source
of all existence which is divine because it is the source of all things." "1 In
other words, General Hershey construed "religious training and belief" as
requiring belief in a deity which is the creator of the universe. Under this
definition exemption has been denied to objectors whose views were based
upon political, humanitarian and philosophical grounds but who did not
profess belief in a deity. Exemption has also been denied to persons who
would ordinarily be regarded as religious, such as humanists and members
of the Ethical Culture Society, because their worship centers around man-
kind and because they do not use the word "God" and do not accept the
orthodox conception of deity even though they do believe in spiritual force.
In practice, draft boards have also tended to identify religion with church
affiliation. For example, persons unable to demonstrate church membership
as well as orthodox theological views, have found difficulty in obtaining
exemption, although the statute clearly covers them.
The question of the meaning of "religious training and belief" first reached
the courts in the case of Mathias Kauten, who was found by Honorable
Lamar Hardy, hearing officer, to be a sincere conscientious objector, but to
lack religious beliefs because he professed to be an atheist. He was a man of
unusual character and integrity, an artist whose objection to war arose out
of his views of the brotherhood of man. Having refused to appear for induc-
tion, he was indicted and tried in the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, where he offered the defense that the induction order
was invalid because based upon an erroneous classification. His conviction
was sustained by the Second Circuit, which held that error of classification
could not be raised by one who had refused to be inducted. Such a question
could be raised, the court said, only by way of a writ of habeas corpus after
induction into the armed forces.45 In a subsequent case the Supreme Court
held this ruling erroneous. 46 In passing, however, the Circuit Court dis-
cussed the meaning of the disputed phrase "religious training and belief,"
and its dictum has been followed and applied generally by courts and by
44. Letter to Dep't of Justice, Mar. 5, 1942.
45. United States v. Kauten, 133 F. (2d) 703 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
46. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946), discussed infra p. 275.
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many draft officials. Speaking through Judge Augustus N. Hand, the
court said:
". .. the provisions of the present statute . . . take into ac-
count the characteristics of a skeptical generation and make the
existence of a conscientious scruple against war in any form, rather
than allegiance to a definite religious group or creed, the basis of ex-
emption. . . A compelling voice of conscience . . . we should
regard as a religious impulse ...
"It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the content
of the term is found in the history of the human race and is incapa-
ble of compression into a few words. Religious belief arises from a
sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individ-
ual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense common to men
in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It
accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief
finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyr-
dom in preference to transgressing its tenets ...
"There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in
a conviction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a
conscientious objection to participation in any war under any cir-
cumstances. The latter, and not the former, may be the basis of ex-
emption under the Act. The former is usually a political objection,
while the latter, we think, may justly be regarded as a response of
the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that
is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has
always been thought a religious impulse." 41
It will be noticed that Judge Hand rejected entirely the argument of
Selective Service officials that the word "religious" in the statute requires
that conscientious objection to war must be based on orthodox theological
beliefs. In the court's view, the promptings of conscience are essentially
religious in character, even though church, creed, and God are all denied.
Regarded in this light, the word "religious" as used in the law merely em-
phasizes the term "conscience" as meaning the compelling voice of some
inward spiritual guide rather than a mere conviction based on intellectual
judgment or expediency.
This interpretation avoids the pitfall into which draft officials have often
fallen. They have felt obliged to insist that mere conscience alone is not
enough for exemption; in addition there must be some religious element
added to conscience, because the law contains the word "religious" as well
as the word "conscientious." The court resolved this verbal difficulty by
pointing out that true conscience is religious in nature.
Not long afterwards the dictum of the Kauten case was solidified into a
holding by the same court in United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer 48 when
47. United States v. Kauten, 133 F. (2d) 703, 708 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
48. 135 F. (2d) 521 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
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the question was presented, as the court indicated in the Kanden case that it
should be, by a writ of habeas corpus after induction. Phillips had been
denied exemption partly on the ground that his objection was not religious
within the meaning of the statute because his views were based upon phil-
osophical and humanitarian concepts, rather than orthodox theology. The
court held the denial erroneous because based upon a different conception
of the religious test from that stated in the Kauten opinion.
The Phillips case was followed in United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 3 also
decided by the Second Circuit. The court reiterated the views expressed in
the Kauten case that so long as an objector's conscientious scruples are based
on his response to an innard mentor, whether it be called conscience or God,
belief in a deity is not required."
The Department of Justice did not petition for certiorari in the above
cases and presumably was content with the rule enunciated in the Second
Circuit. The Director of Selective Service, General Hershey, however, per-
sisted in his former view, and many draft boards have followed his lead. In
his report covering the year following Pearl Harbor, General Hershey re-
peated his construction of the law as requiring belief in "a Deity or a power
above and beyond the human." "'
The attitude of the Director of Selective Service on this question has been
of utmost importance because he stands at the top of the quasi judicial
bodies which pass upon exemptions for conscientious objectors. Decisions by
the draft boards may be appealed to the President when the appeal board is
not unanimous, and in all cases where necessary to prevent injustice or to
correct an error of law the Director of Selective Service, either upon his own
motion or upon request of a draftee, may order that an appeal to the Presi-
dent be taken.12 The responsibility of deciding appeals to the President has
been delegated by him to the Director of Selective Service.53 General
Hershey, therefore, has been the last administrative resort, and his con-
struction of the law necessarily has great weight with draft boards-perhaps
greater weight than the views of the Federal courts since in most cases
conscientious objectors have been unable to persuade the courts to take
jurisdiction.
Despite the intransigence of General Hershey on this subject, other
officials have approved the law laid down in the Second Circuit. The De-
partment of Justice, for example, instructed draft boards in federal prisons
to follow the Kauten and Phillips decisions in reclassifying conscientious
objectors. 4
The construction placed upon the statute by the Second Circuit has been
49. 141 F. (2d) 845 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
50. Id. at 847.
51. SELEc=rw SERVICE ix WAR TmE (Selective Service System, 1943) 258.
52. Selective Service Regs. §§ 628.1, 628.2 (1942) as amended.
53. ExEc. ORDER No. 8619, 5 FED. REG. 5256 (1940).
54. Memorandum dated April 15, 1944.
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sharply criticized by one writer '5 as amounting to judicial legislation, and
the contrary view has been recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Berman
v. United States,5" with one judge dissenting. Petition for certiorari in the
latter case was denied 57 apparently on the ground, as urged by the govern-
ment, that the case was properly decided on the facts and that the disputed
construction of the statute was not necessary to the decision.
JUDICIAL REVIEW *
A technical question of much interest which arose out of draft exemption
is the matter of judicial review of Selective Service rulings. Although the
body of administrative law has been greatly expanded in recent years, the
circumstances under which courts will review rulings and the extent of such
review have not been finally settled. The unsettled state of the law is re-
flected in the cases relating to judicial review of draft classifications.
The Selective Training and Service Act provides,5 8 like the 1917 draft
law,5" that the decisions of draft boards shall be final. However, it is well-
settled that in spite of this provision the courts will review draft board deci-
sions when (1) a full and fair hearing has been denied; (2) the decision is
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on an issue of fact; or (3) the decision
is contrary to law. 0 When one of these conditions occurs, the courts will not
consider the case de novo, but will merely review the record of proceedings
before the draft boards.
As to the scope of such review there is a divergence of opinion in the
courts. Some courts have applied the usual rule of administrative law that
review of the facts is limited to ascertaining whether there is substantial
evidence to support the findings.61 Others have held that judicial inquiry
extends only to a determination of whether there is any evidence whatever
to support the findings,6 2 and still other courts have restricted their review
to the question of whether a board has considered all the evidence presented
55. Waite, Section 5(g) of the Selective Service Act as Amended by the Court (1944), 29
MINN. L. REV. 22.
56. 156 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946).
57. December 23, 1946, 15 U.S. L. WEEK 3240.
* Compare the author's point of view on judicial review of Selective Service rulings
with that expressed in NOTE (1946) 56 YALE L. J. 403 infra.-Ed.
58. 54 STAT. 893 (1940), 50 U. S. C., App. § 310(a)(2) (1940).
59. 40 STAT. 78 (1917), 50 U. S. C., App. § 204 (1940).
60. See United States ex rel. Pascher v. Kinkead, 248 Fed. 141 (D. N. J. 1918), aff'd
250 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918); Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (C.C.A. 2d, 1917).
61. Benesch v. Underwood, 132 F. (2d) 430 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942); Rase v. United States,
129 F. (2d) 204 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942); United States v. Messersmith, 138 F. (2d) 599 (C.C.A.
7th, 1943); Graf v. Mallon, 138 F. (2d) 230 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); Seele v. United States, 133 F.
(2d) 1015 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919).
62. United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F. (2d) 944 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1944); Checinsk
v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 461 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942). See United States v. Buttecali, 46 F.
Supp. 39 (S. D. Tex. 1942), aff'd 130 F. (2d) 172 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942).
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to it-in other words, whether the board accorded the registrant procedural
due process of law.63
Even more important than the scope of judicial review has been the
tendency of most courts automatically to apply to draft decisions the general
rule of administrative law that the order of an administrative agency may
not be challenged by one who has disobeyed it. Early in the administration
of the statute this rule was applied in the Third Circuit C4 in a case involving
a Jehovah's Witness who had been denied exemption as a minister. When
ordered to report for induction, the registrant refused and pleaded that the
board's action was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and its order
therefore invalid. The court declined to entertain this defense and refused
to review the draft classification on the ground that the registrant, having
disobeyed the order, could not attack it collaterally in a criminal proceeding
based upon such disobedience, but must first submit to induction as ordered
and then raise the issue by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Throughout
most of the war, this view was followed in all circuits except the FourthPS
The Supreme Court first passed on this question in Falbo v. United States,cs
in which it upheld the interpretation previously evolved in the circuits. A
Jehovah's Witness, Nick Falbo, had been convicted for refusing to report to a
camp for conscientious objectors after being denied exemption as a minister.
The Supreme Court held that he had not completed the Selective Service
process, which comes to an end only when one reports for induction or as-
signment to a conscientious objectors' camp, and consequently could not
question the validity of his classification. Justice Murphy filed a dissenting
opinion criticizing the artificiality of the court's reasoning.
The practical result of the approach taken by the Circuit Courts of Appeal
and approved in the Falbo case usually. was to deny any review whatever.
Few Jehovah's Witnesses or conscientious objectors have been willing to
submit to induction, since a subsequent denial of habeas corpus would leave
them subject to military jurisdiction. Their choice would then be between
sacrificing their principles by participating in military activities or laying
themselves open to imprisonment or even death as a court martial might
63. Ex parle Stanziale, 138 F. (2d) 312 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943); Crutchfield v. United States,
142 F. (2d) 170 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943). See also (1942) 10 Gao. WAsH. L. Rav. 827, 837-.
64. United States v. Grieme, 128 F. (2d) 811 (C.C.A. 3d, 1942).
65. Sirski v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 1st, 1944); United States v. Flako-
wicz, 146 F. (2d) 874 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945); United States v. Estep, 150 F. (2d) 76S (C.C.A 3d,
1945), rev'd, 327 U. S. 114 (1946); Fletcher v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 262 (C.C.A. 5th,
1942); United States v. Rinko, 147 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945); Gibson v. United States,
149 F. (2d) 751 (C.C.A. 8th, 1945). But see Goff v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 610 (C.C.A.
4th, 1943); Ba~dey v. United States, 134 F. (2d) 998 (C.C.A. 4th, 1943).
Compare British decisions allowing full judicial review under the World War I draft:
Hawkes v. Moxey, 86 L.J. K. B. (x.s.) 1530 (1917); Offord v. H-iscock, 86 L.J. K. B. (N.s.)
941 (1917).
66. 320 U. S. 549 (194). The question had first been presented to the Supreme Court
in 1943, but the case went off on another issue. Bowles v. United States, 319 U. S. 33 (1943).
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direct.6 7 Moreover, some of the few hardy souls who have submitted to
induction have undergone severe treatment at the hands of military au-
thorities."8 It is thus a severe burden which the courts have imposed upon
such persons by holding that induction is a prerequisite to judicial review.
The reason for the general rule which prohibits attack on administrative
orders by those who have disobeyed them is the promotion of convenience
and orderly procedure. However, it is difficult to see how administrative
convenience is promoted by requiring a man to submit to induction before
he can question the acts of his draft board. The order of induction is the
last step in the administrative process. The draft board has then closed its
flies and completed the case. The induction ceremony is conducted by the
military forces. The refusal to be inducted occurs at a point where the entire
administrative procedure is over and the drafted man has been delivered to
the military authorities. It can hardly be said that judicial review at this
point would interfere with the draft process, since that has already been
completed.
Only a few months after the Falbo case was decided, the Court narrowed
its import. In Billings v. Truesdell 6 9 it was held that one who had reported
for induction but refused to take the oath of induction, could not forcibly
be inducted and could by writ of habeas corpus secure release from the mili-
tary authorities. The rationale was that military jurisdiction does not apply
until a person has been actually inducted and that induction can be accom-
plished only by administering a voluntary oath. The somewhat strained
distinction between reporting for induction and taking the oath was ap-
parently concocted to soften the harsh effect of the Falbo ruling, for at the
end of its opinion the court went beyond the issues immediately confronting
it to state:
"Moreover, it should be remembered that he who reports at the
induction station is following the procedure outlined in the Falbo
case for the exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Unless he
follows that procedure he may not challenge the legality, of his clas-
sification in the courts. But we can hardly say that he must report
to the military in order to exhaust his administrative remedies and
then say that if he does so report he may be forcibly inducted
against his will. That would indeed make a trap of the Falbo case
by subjecting those who reported for completion of the Selective
Service process to more severe penalties than those who stayed
away in defiance of the board's order to report." 11
The plain implication of this passage was that the requirements for judicial
review of draft board classifications would be met by reporting at an induc-
67. ARTICLES OF WAR, ART. 64, 41 STAT. 801 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1536 (1940).
68. See CORNELL, TEE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND THE LAW (1943) 52-6.
69. 321 U. S. 542 (1944).
70. Id. at 558-9.
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tion center, although thereafter the oath of induction was refused. By
following this procedure, a registrant would remain under civil jurisdiction
and, if prosecuted for refusing actually to be inducted, could defend on the
ground that the classification was unreasonable.
Lower courts, however, seemed unable to accept the obvious fact that the
Supreme Court had in the space of three months reversed itself by this
backhanded method, and they continued to deny judicial review to those
who, following the procedure suggested in the Billings case, reported for
induction but refused to take the oath.71 The matter was finally put to rest,
but not until February, 1946, when the Supreme Court squarely held in
Estep v. United States 72 that a registrant who completed the Selective Service
process by reporting for induction but refused to take the oath of induction
and was indicted for such refusal could directly challenge the validity of his
classification and need not first submit to military jurisdiction and then raise
the question by way of habeas corpus. The court pointed out that it would
be senseless to refuse such a defense in a criminal proceeding since imme-
diately after conviction the same defense could be presented by habeas
corpus. If, therefore, the defense should not be allowed, the Act would be
so construed as to require the courts "to march up the hill when it is ap-
parent from the beginning that they will have to march down again."
This argument would seem to apply with equal plausibility to the re-
quirement that a person go through the motions of reporting for induction
before being deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies. But,
whatever the force of the reasoning, the decision was logically inevitable
after the Falbo and Billings opinions, and the law on this point is now ciear
beyond question.
In passing, the court took occasion to express its opinion on another point
on which the Circuit Courts have split: the substantial evidence rule. Be-
cause the statute makes decisions of local boards "final," the court said that
they may be attacked only when the boards go beyond their jurisdiction by
failing to act in conformity with the regulations, and that this point is
reached "only if there is no basis in fact for the conclusion." In other words,
the substantial evidence rule which, usually applies in reviewing adminis-
trative decisions does not obtain, and review may be had only if there is no
evidence to support the finding of the draft board. It was remarked by the
court that this is the scope of judicial inquiry in deportation cases where
Congress has made the orders of the immigration authorities "final." Thus
the Supreme Court has sanctioned the middle way followed in the Trainin
case, 3 in preference to either the liberal "substantial evidence" rule or the
harsh rule of ensuring only a full and fair hearing.
71. United States v. Estep, 150 F. (2d) 768 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945), re'd, 327 U. S. 114
(1946), and cases cited therein; United States v. Rinko, 147 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945).
72. 327 U. S. 114 (1946).
73. United States ex rei. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F. (2d) 944 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944), di"-ued
suj'ra pp. 265-6.
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